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Since the start of the year, the difficulties of small and medium en-terprises (SMEs) have made national news. The situation grew seri-ous in April with the media speaking of an unprecedented “wave of
bankruptcies” ( daobi chao 倒闭潮 ); but Chinese authorities flatly rejected
such talk. Apart from the uncertain international economic context, three
main factors lie behind SMEs’ difficulties: a sharp rise in salary costs, rock-
eting raw material prices, and restrictive domestic monetary policy.
The phenomenon is especially noticeable in the Yangtze and Pearl River
deltas, where private small-scale export industries in particular have been
seriously affected. In Wenzhou City (Zhejiang Province), renowned for its
entrepreneurs, 40 percent of SMEs went bankrupt, and others suspended
production or shut their factories. Some SME bosses fled or committed
suicide as they were unable to repay loans, often procured in the informal
economy. (8) The contagion even spread to northern China, confirming the
national character of the crisis.
This wave of bankruptcies affecting SMEs in China is of a much different
nature from those closely linked to the 2008 financial crisis, which hit several
national economies (and hurt SMEs) around the world. In China, the difficul-
ties are mainly linked to the firms’ intrinsic weaknesses and to the complex
domestic context. The persisting global economic crisis is merely a second-
ary cause of the difficulties they face. Some entrepreneurs think the current
economic environment is much worse for Chinese SMEs than in 2008. Many
different industries were seriously affected, leading some entrepreneurs to-
wards speculation and property deals, where short-term profits are greater.
SMEs have been unable to retain staff due to sharply rising wage levels.
National People’s Congress Standing Committee member Gu Shengzu said
during a discussion on SMEs at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
summit in Chengdu in August 2011 that the average wage increased by 20
to 30 percent this year. This has led some SMEs to suspend orders, fearing
their inability to carry on operating, according to Caijing journalists Yang
Zhongxu and Mo Li. China’s labour market is gradually changing, and the
abundant labour model is now a thing of the past. The interprovincial
labour supply imbalance is becoming sharper, raising demand for a “new
generation” of skilled migrant workers.
The second cause of difficulties is the shortage and rise in prices of im-
ported raw materials, especially oil, on which the Chinese economy is
heavily dependent.
Apart from the three factors of production, other elements adding to the
SME crisis are appreciation of the yuan, various taxes, and the rising cost
of land. All these elements have led to a considerable rise in SMEs’ produc-
tion costs.
The current tight monetary policy leading to a sharp rise in the cost of
capital makes it difficult for SMEs to raise funds. The worst affected are the
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ment has introduced a transition period of three to five years during which
farmers would not only be able to live in the city but also retain the land
use rights acquired in their villages (including subsidies for crops) as well as
social rights (to have more than one child in some rural areas, for instance).
As Hu Shuli has noted, while this ambitious policy as a whole seems con-
cerned with securing farmers’ rights and appears humane, Chongqing’s rapid
urbanisation plans are nevertheless being carried out through administrative
diktat, which raises the question of possible drifts. Moreover, the model of-
fered in Chongqing relies on a special political organisation, and it would be
difficult to repeat it elsewhere: in fact, Chongqing is an autonomous munic-
ipality ( zhi xia shi 直辖市, like Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin ) and is thus not
dependent on any province. Chongqing’s government has a direct line to the
central authorities, which gives it considerable leeway in adopting innovative
policies and greater freedom in raising and disbursing funds.
Chongqing therefore appears to be a testing ground for a new type of so-
called “Third Hand” policy, at once interesting and novel. Given the city’s
constraints and particularities, however, it would be risky to see it as a
model for the rest of China.
z Translated by N. Jayaram
under-qualified or those lacking collateral. These SMEs are compelled to
turn to informal loan markets such as pawning, with interest rates of 50
percent or even higher in some cities. According to Wang Li and Yu Hairong
of Xin Shiji, underground financial networks, such as loans among private
parties, are growing apace, with interest rates often far higher than the
central bank’s indicative rate.
With the world economy still emerging from recession and talk of a sec-
ond crisis, SMEs’ difficulties are growing. Economic uncertainties in Europe
and the United States have led to a sharp fall in external demand for Chi-
nese exports. As for the domestic market, following the 4 trillion yuan
stimulus package unveiled in November 2008, Chinese authorities have
had to tighten monetary policy since January 2010. Beijing has thus set
stricter criteria for bank credit nationwide in order to fight inflation, which
reached 6.2 percent on an annualised basis in August 2011, by raising bond
yields 13 times in 21 months, and rates five times. Commercial banks’ tight
liquidity has aggravated the financial situation of SMEs.
Besides these exogenous cases, SMEs have also faced problems with
management and competitiveness. China’s industrial restructuring and op-
timisation have been too slow to help SMEs’ development. Further, the im-
perfect market system and lack of regulation governing property rights
and intellectual property create an uncertain and inefficient economic en-
vironment. Another peculiarity of the Chinese market is the focus of bank
credit on major cities, especially the concentration on financing major
companies. The difference between the interest rate charged to private
firms and that for state-owned companies is enormous, meaning that
bank credit facilities are not equitably allocated. According to Gu Shengzu,
fewer than 10 percent of SMEs can obtain funding from the formal finan-
cial system, most having to deal with private loans ( minjian jiedai 民间借
贷 ) outside the regulated banking system. Structural problems of credit al-
location have led to a rise in the interest rate imposed on private loans; this
might eventually cause a financial crisis if the private loan bubble were to
burst. This might well spread and have repercussions on the real economy
and the formal financial system. Some experts indicate that the situation
could prove disastrous in certain regions, especially in Zhejiang Province
and even more so in Wenzhou City, where informal financing is very highly
developed. Any break in the chain of private loans could have a domino ef-
fect, infecting the national economy.
In this climate, many entrepreneurs prefer to shut their firms and seek
more viable investment opportunities. In effect, a tendency towards pri-
vate capital flight from the real economy towards speculative investments
yielding short-term profits has been observed. This creates a potential
threat to real-world industry. Monetary policy has been ineffective in rem-
edying the problem of liquidity shortage. Monetary authorities face diffi-
culties in striking a balance between expansionist and restrictive policies,
facing, on the one hand, SMEs that lack funding, and on the other, entities
implicated in usurious and speculative activities. Premier Wen Jiabao, writ-
ing in the publication Qiushi, (9) urged attention to long-term and cumula-
tive consequences of monetary policies in order to ensure the crisis would
not have too heavy an impact on the real economy. (10)
Silk Road Holding Group chairman Ling Lanfang (11) was quoted by Caijing
journalists as saying that all economic actors complain of difficulties with
finance but that in reality the most affected were industrials. However,
companies that obtained funds through connections and used them for
speculating on the financial market have not lacked for funding at all. In
August and September, Caijing journalists went to observe the economic
situation of SMEs in Zhejiang and Guangdong provinces, which are heavily
dependent on the industrial sector. They noted that few entrepreneurs re-
mained in the real economy, many having taken to speculation while fac-
tories shut or went bankrupt.
Yang Zhongxu and Mo Li note that despite a rising chorus of voices ask-
ing for a more accommodative monetary policy, a small number of entre-
preneurs warn that due to the close links between state-owned firms,
banks, SMEs, private financial institutions, and property promoters, too
rapid a relaxation of monetary policy would mainly benefit speculators.
Most economists and officials share this view.
Caijing journalists report that this summer, the head of an industry body
in Wenzhou, Zhou Dewen, (12) established a classification of SMEs based on
their evolution and activities. According to Zhou, 10 percent of SMEs seek
to boost productivity, 20 percent are trying to transform their activities,
and the majority are involved in speculation. He says that despite many
policies unveiled by the government and the China Banking Regulatory
Commission, major banks give priority to profitability and are not worried
about the survival of SMEs. Major banks take the stand that it is difficult
to overcome the risks linked to SME financing and thus prefer to limit ex-
posure to them.
During the summer summit of Chinese entrepreneurs on 16 September
2011, Gu Shengzu said 60 to 70 percent of SMEs were struggling to sur-
vive, 10 percent were pursuing structural optimisation, and 20 percent
were transforming their activities. Among the difficulties SMEs faced, fi-
nancing problems were exacerbated in 2011 and remain most urgent.
Meanwhile, the authorities in charge of industry appear not to have no-
ticed the wave of SME bankruptcies, something Gu Shengzu said was at-
tributable to “zombies” that had failed to declare their bankruptcy to the
administration. Gu proposed six solutions to resolve the SMEs’ financing
difficulties, as reported by journalist Peng Chunlai:
– develop microcredit companies and small rural banks to service
SMEs;
– innovate in the finance domain to facilitate access through, for in-
stance, internet platforms for financing SMEs;
– adopt fiscal advantages or subsidies to stimulate bank credit;
– create systems of guarantors to facilitate lending to SMEs;
– relax financial control, continue liberalising interest rates and fi-
nancial system reform;
– strengthen direct financing and widen the space for private capital
investment.
According to Wan Donghua, in order to help SMEs emerge from this cri-
sis, the problems have to be seen through two dimensions: those factors
exogenous and endogenous to SMEs.
As for exogenous factors, a start has to be made with monetary and fis-
cal policies to alleviate the penury of SME financing as soon as possible. As
inflationary pressure remains substantial, monetary policy will remain
tight in the short term. In order to support SMEs and regularise private
capital flows, microcredit companies and rural banks must be ceded a big-
ger role. Financial sector innovation has to be sped up, the financial market
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deregulated, and a professional organisation built to direct private capital
towards the real economy. Finally, fiscal incentives for SMEs would be the
way to go about resolving the problems of financial overload in China. Fi-
nancial support policies such as tax reductions and temporary alleviation of
fiscal burdens as well as subsidies would need to be adopted. On the other
hand, the structure and functioning of the labour market has to be
strengthened, working conditions have to be improved, and the industrial
structure imbalance between eastern and western China has to be set right.
It is also important to speed up modernisation of the agricultural sector in
order to free up labour and improve worker mobility towards SMEs.
As regards endogenous factors, SMEs have to learn to adapt to a rela-
tively unfavourable environment. They must make use of the economic
and financial pressures they face ( bian yali wei dongli 变压力为动力 ) in
order to speed up transformation and modernisation of the industrial
structure, speed up technological innovation, and boost labour productiv-
ity. SMEs could also create mutual aid systems or cooperate to benefit
from remedial measures when needed. Meanwhile, there’s no free lunch in
the market system, and it is inevitable that some firms will disappear, ben-
efiting others that might grow bigger and stronger.
In order to eventually move towards a market system with fair competi-
tion among companies and to extricate SMEs from the current crisis, the
following points need attention: continue improving the market economy
system, abolish outdated property rights, and facilitate companies’ market
access by lowering legal barriers. In order to resolve SMEs’ financing prob-
lems, financial system reform has to be pursued to remedy the current sit-
uation dominated by major banks. To do this, a multi-level financing sys-
tem better suited to their needs has to be gradually established through
the creation of special funds backed by fiscal policies, as well as more com-
munity banks, small and medium sized commercial banks, and micro-
credit guaranteeing companies in non-bank financial institutions.
z Translated by N. Jayaram
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